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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

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SUBJECT: Consulate General's Contribution to NIE on Tropical Africa.

Enclosed please find observations of this post on current developments in the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, French Equatorial Africa and the Trust Territory of the French Cameroons.

The Section C - Local Communist Strength, Influence, Prospects and Soviet Intentions - for all areas, was drafted by Vice Consul Roger Bearce and concurred in by the Principal Officer after discussion and minor changes; Vice Consul Bearce also prepared the Section B on racial tensions in the French Cameroons. Consul Margaret Joy Tibbetts assisted the Principal Officer with the material on the Belgian Congo found in Sections A, B and D. Vice Consul R. L. Gross collaborated with the Principal Officer in the preparation of Sections A, B and D on French Equatorial Africa. The coordination of the material and overall direction for preparation as well as final drafting are the work of the Principal Officer. Although policy recommendations are not called for, some are found in the last paragraph of the first enclosure. These may be attributed to the Principal Officer.

The Department is requested to credit all contributors.

Robert G. McGregor
Robert G. McGregor
American Consul General

Enclosures

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

☒ CIA has no objection to declass

☐ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS S C

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From LeopoldvilleIDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR TRENDS AND PROBLEMS IN AREA:ESTIMATE OF PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES TO FREE WORLD

1) Taking the area as a whole, it is important to the free world as a source of strategic and critical materials; 2) our partners in NATO (France and Belgium in this area) would be crippled without their African dependencies; 3) the area is also important strategically and could become vital if the further deterioration of the French position in North Africa rendered United States air bases there untenable; 4) a determined attempt is being made to implant firmly the essential elements of Western civilization. The next 10-20 years will be vital in the formation of the African. It is to our interest to see that he is not enslaved by Communism or manipulated either by Nasser-type nationalism or Indian imperialism.

The following trends and problems exist in all four areas:

1) Nationalism -- Strong in French Cameroons; in embryo in French Equatorial Africa and Ruanda-Urundi; non-existent in the Belgian Congo.

2) Avidity for education -- In all areas the African knows that education means power. The eagerness with which he seeks information is sometimes pathetic.

3) Pride of race -- The African is still the tutored one and still recognizes his inferiority to the white man. He watches carefully events in Black Africa and applauds progress of African leaders.

4) Move toward independence -- While independence as such is not noticeable in the area of the Consulate General's responsibility, Africans in the French Cameroons watch closely events in French Togoland and draw conclusions; F.E.A. and Congo officials are worried over possible trouble in the Sudan. The Belgians keep a weather eye on Uganda.

5) Communism -- The French are at a disadvantage in dealing with it. The Belgians repress promptly any evidence of it. It exists in all areas. When it can be watched, it is seen to be in the organizing or cadre stage. The May 1955 riots in the French Cameroons should be studied as a model of what can be expected from militant Communism in Africa.

6) Poverty and lack of investment capital -- In French areas this is particularly noticeable. The Belgian Congo will have to seek capital in large quantities if it embarks on industrialization.

At best estimate the following are probable developments in the area:

Left to itself and even with present government plans, the area covered by the Consulate General would change very gradually in ten years. But pressures of all kinds inside the area and from without are forcing the pace of social, economic

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and political change to such an extent as to make logical predictions exceedingly difficult. Africans will assume increasingly greater responsibilities in government, business, education, etc. They will become more articulate and opinionated; they will react toward racialism with violence; as they reach positions of power the Africans will exploit them for what they are worth; they may be expected to show little gratitude for the benefits brought them; they will be easy prey for propaganda.

Economically the pace of change will be slower. The Congo will probably enter an industrialization phase by the exploitation of hydroelectric energy in the Lower Congo (Inga); labor unions will become real factors; purchasing power of the African will increase and imports to cater to his tastes will assume a larger proportion; transport costs will bring to a head the controversial problem of transport monopoly; the Ten Year Plan will complete the infrastructure and further decrease Congo vulnerability to a drop in world prices for raw materials.

In F.E.A. and the Cameroons mineral potential will be explored and exploited with more vigor. But lacking capital investment the area will remain poor and backward with consequent danger of Africans seeking radical solutions.

Potential consequences to the free world:

The Soviets are showing an interest in Central Africa that will not diminish; the Bandung Conference associated Eastern and Oriental states with Africa. As against these potent influences, the free world is represented in Africa by the Colonial Powers. The West has said it espouses the principle of self-determination, but in his impatience the African cannot help look over his shoulder at those who would dethrone the "colonial" masters. Western civilization is not yet firmly enough implanted nor has it sufficiently supplanted tribalism or fetichism to be the strong arm necessary to resist demagoguery, subversion or glittering promises. In other words, Western presence in authority is absolutely essential to the area if it is to remain tied to the free world. There should be, however, a new note struck—one of hopefulness, one of challenge, one that will set the positiveness of the free world against the backward pull and negativism of the new imperialism. The hope for Central Africa lies in the ability and willingness of the Western powers to prove their strength in Africa; to wipe out disease, illiteracy, poverty, not in the Congo only because the Belgians can afford it, but equally in French, Portuguese and British Africa, because we cannot afford not to do it. It is senseless to implement nationalism in Africa when so much time and effort is expended to get rid of it in Europe.

A conference of African Colonial Powers should be called to explore areas where common experience could lead to joint action; to study investment opportunities and invite foreign and domestic capital on equal and attractive terms; to seek common political solutions in Bantu Africa that will make the African aware of his considerable stake in the free world and correct political disparities that are only wedges for Communist or premature nationalist penetration. The United States can and should help in this. Being a signatory to the Act of Berlin in 1885 and the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye in 1919, our interest is legitimate and should not be resented.

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Desp. No. 331From LeopoldvilleBELGIAN CONGO AND RUANDA-URUNDIA. GROWTH AND CONSEQUENCES OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

In Intelligence Report 6390, August 24, 1953, p. 19, is the following statement: "The time may arrive relatively soon--within 5 to 10 years--when Belgium will be faced with demands from Congo natives for development in the direction of self-government and the ultimate elimination of present limitations to economic and social advancement." Three of the 5-10 year period envisaged have passed and no public or formal "demands from Congo natives for development in the direction of self-government" have been made. This does not mean that a head of steam is not building up pressures.

IR-6390 also says: "They [the Belgians] are making plans for limited local participation in government...." This refers to the Statut des Villes which was then and is still in draft form. The original draft has been altered so that even when the Statut des Villes is promulgated it is unlikely to grant franchise without coupling it with a veto power vested in the Colonial Government. The Governor General in his annual address to the Government Council in July 1955, which received prior approval in Brussels, mentioned proposals for "basic changes in tribal and rural district structure" that would "transform them into communes patterned after the Belgian example." In the same speech the Governor General said, "the political formation we wish to favor....should evolve toward a democratic organization." Again, "the representative council that will be formed ought to....be an institution capable of becoming accountable to the electoral body for the exercise of local authority." It will be noticed that the future tense is used when speaking of political reforms. It is significant that the Governor General devoted his whole annual address in 1955 to problems inherent in white/black relationships in the Congo.

Changes in the structure of the Government Councils, Provincial Councils, etc., which have been proposed since IR-6390 are for the purpose of eliminating race as a characteristic or qualification required for membership. Even these changes have not run the full gamut of Belgian procedure.

So far then as growth of African nationalism in the Congo is concerned it may be fairly assumed that pressures continue to mount but have not yet reached the point where the Belgians feel obliged to relieve them by immediately implementing carefully planned reforms to existing legislation. Two African secret societies (Kitawala and Kibangism) are actively anti-white, mystic and illegal. They are repressed periodically. So far they have no central organization; their influence is purely local.

No one publicly disputes the sincerity of Belgian utterances that the Congolese are being led toward representative government along democratic lines. Acceptance by the Congolese of this sincerity is open to doubt.

One should not overlook the role of the Belgian secret service (Surêté) in spotting disaffection and taking prompt remedial action (see Section D). The

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evolved African is watched closely and is afraid of being caught out engaging in what might be considered activities prejudicial to the public interest. The Surêté literally has its informers everywhere, and intelligence thus gathered, when added to the missionary network of the Catholic Church, makes it difficult for any political or subversive activity to progress far. Nationalism is no more than a phrase in the Belgian Congo. The proverbial tranquility of the Congo thus rests upon the effectiveness of the Intelligence Service and continued economic prosperity; if either of these controlling factors should falter, then the security of the Congo is likely to be threatened.

It might be well in revising the text of the Belgian Congo section (H) of IR-6390 to insert at the beginning the following sentence: "Whereas parts of West and South Africa have been in contact with European civilization for 3-400 years, the Africans in the Congo Basin have known the white man only during the past 50-75 years." Naturally nationalism would be retarded in the Basin and tribal rivalries, jealousies and differences remain a great barrier to the development of nationalistic sentiment. Independence as a slogan, however, would command as much enthusiasm in this part of Africa as in any other, and Africans in the Congo are keenly interested in political developments elsewhere in this Continent.

B. OUTLOOK INCREASED RACIAL TENSIONS

The reader's attention is directed to comments offered under Section D below, "Nature and Speed of Social and Economic Changes." The prospect for increase of racial tensions would be frightening if the prosperity of the Congo faltered seriously or if for any other reason the economic security of the African were placed in jeopardy.

Friction between black and white is increasing but not disproportionately to the ever more numerous points of contact between the races. The "evolué" seeks recognition of his status. An area of friction where racial competition is a daily occurrence is that of employment to fill lower paid jobs (in European sense) and the higher paid same jobs (in the African sense). As the Governor General said in his July 1955 speech, "there are too many Europeans still who, vested with an authority which they derive from others or which they arrogate to themselves, bring to their relations with Africans an odious character of condescending pride and a familiarity which hurts and sometimes rudeness and brutality." On the other hand, there are those among the Africans, the Governor General goes on to say, who "having acquired some slight merit themselves, suffer from an inferiority complex and give themselves the air of martyrs."

Since there is no politics in the Congo and hence no European-African tension in this field, it is found to a very large extent in the battle for jobs, higher and equal wages, benefits, etc. The first university in the Congo opened its door at Kinwenda outside Leopoldville in October 1954. Another has been set up in Elisabethville. They will begin in a few years to turn out Africans who are educationally just as qualified as the products of universities in Belgium. Graduates will demand jobs and expect equal pay with Europeans.

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Africans in government employ are members of what is known as the "auxiliary" service. Scales of remuneration are 1/4 to 1/5 what they are for the European. The African argues that the European judges the state of his evolution by his assimilation of European ideas and practices of housing, dress, food, education, etc. Yet his low wages, lack of credit facilities and residential area restrictions preclude his obtaining the trappings of European culture. There is a growing resentment against the strongly paternalistic practice universally applied of paying an African approximately 40% of his total earnings in cash and the balance in amenities (housing, medical benefits, family indemnity, food rations, etc.), whereas the European decides himself how he will spend his earnings. There is a contradiction here that presents the Belgians with a dilemma. Paternalism is the armor of social security to the African; he enjoys being spoiled by "cradle to grave care", but he resents being treated as a child even as he is being forced along the road to social uplift.

Belgians talk sincerely of the unfolding of the Belgo-Congolese community. Today fraternization of the races practically stops with the blowing of the factory whistle. There are Europeans of good-will who sponsor Belgo-Congolese cultural groups; the Federated Colonist Association assists an African Middle Class Association; a few Africans frequent public and private social gatherings of Europeans. But one has the feeling that all of these efforts would be swept aside if the African decided the time had come for him to assert his right to determine his own destiny.

The "white settler" in the Congo is not numerous (approximately 8,000 of the 90,000 white and 12 million natives). While vociferous, his voice is inevitably lost in the clamor for improvement in the status of the African. The settler scorns South African "apartheid". He is glad conditions that gave rise to Mau-Mau in Kenya do not exist in the Congo. But he deeply resents Belgian Government policy that keeps down immigration of new settlers; that deprives him of forced labor; that is forcing upon him a social and economic relationship to the African that he was unprepared to accept when he invested initially in the Congo.

It can be said, and perhaps for the purposes of this paper it is all that need be said, that there is no intolerable tension between races in the Congo; that there is no unrest and that there is not likely to be any that the Belgian authority cannot control or anticipate at least for the immediate future. The Belgians are firmly in control and the Africans docile.

C. LOCAL COMMUNIST STRENGTH, INFLUENCE, PROSPECTS, AND SOVIET INTENTIONS

The strength of Communist party membership in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi is nil. Extremely stringent immigration controls, designed to keep out politically undesirable persons of any nationality (including Belgian), have made it possible for the Belgian and Congo Sureté to keep any known Communist from becoming established in Belgian Africa.

Controls over emigration, including the issuances of exit permits to Congolese for travel outside Belgian Africa, are such as to limit the issuance of such documents to a minimum number of "politically reliable" individuals. These

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controls tend greatly to reduce the danger of recruitment of Congolese for indoctrination and training and subsequent return to the Congo as Communist organizers.

Over the years the Congo Sureté has developed colony-wide an effective system of native informants in key positions and in critical areas. Surveillance by the Sureté of suspected individuals, either African or white, and censorship of mail to and from Africans or whites indicating suspect contact with other areas of the world, both tend to uncover potentially dangerous individuals before they are able to develop dangerous contacts or major subversive activities. In addition, there is close surveillance of the local press which knows from experience the limits within which it must remain. There is strict control over importation of publications by subscription or for sale. Potentially dangerous individuals, if white, are expelled. If they are Africans from other territories, they also are expelled. If they are Congolese, they are relegated to special isolated communities established expressly for political "relégués".

The only means of Communist access to Belgian Africa which seems to have had so far a very limited measure of success, and then for only short periods of time, is legal or illegal entry from an adjoining territory. Only the Portuguese of the adjoining territories have the tight controls comparable to those in force in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. The long and isolated frontiers of Belgian Africa make virtually impossible the complete elimination of illegal entry and smuggling of contraband documents.

The Colonial Section of Belgian Communist Party continues stubbornly to send propaganda via sailors whose ships are scheduled to touch at Congo ports. The Sureté personnel on port duty is on constant watch against such attempts.

It seems logical to assess as the most likely immediate targets for Communist cultivation 1) evolues, 2) members of subversive secret sects, and 3) the unemployed. Certain of the evolues, impatient with and unconvinced of the sincerity of Belgium's promises of political and social advancement for Congolese, are ripe to follow anyone who gives hope of immediate advancement. Although politically and socially much less mature than the evolues, the activists and followers of subversive secret sects constitute fertile ground for Communism because of their anti-white sentiments and their resentment of the Belgian Congo Government's repressive measures toward their sects. At present, unemployment is not a major problem. Since the majority of unemployed are found in major population centers, where they have no recourse to traditional tribal assistance and security, this element would be equally open to Communist exploitation.

The Soviets, in their planning for penetration of Belgian Africa, face effective Belgian security measures and controls. They also face a country which, for Africa, is economically sound and prosperous. The most vulnerable point of ideological attack is constituted by a certain amount of political frustration among the Congolese. This is a condition which is open to exploitation on a countrywide basis, as well as within the overall anti-colonialist policy of Communist propaganda and agitation. The means of penetration most likely to

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succeed is the use of Africans indoctrinated and trained in Communist ideals and methods sent into the Congo from neighboring territories lacking the stringent controls which are in force in Belgian Africa.

There is a Czech Consulate at Leopoldville, a one-man post, devoted primarily to trade and commerce under the BLEU - Czech Trade Agreement of April 1, 1955. Besides this, it is known that the Czech Consul does political reporting on Central Africa. It is highly unlikely that he himself would compromise the continued local representation of Iron Curtain trade interests by becoming directly involved in political action or espionage. However, the Czech Consul does have a regular courier service and there are Czech trade representatives who occasionally visit the Congo and French Equatorial Africa. These visitors are subject to surveillance by Congo and F.E.A. Surtees, and are rightly considered as potential Iron Curtain intelligence sources or personnel. In January 1956, the Soviet Ambassador to Belgium made an official tour of Belgian Africa. This is the first instance of an official Soviet personality visiting the area and is clearly in line with growing evidence of Soviet interest in Africa. It is reliably reported that after the visit of the Ambassador, he approached the Belgian Government concerning the possibility of establishing direct Soviet representation in the Congo. The Belgian reply was an uncompromising negative.

D. NATURE AND SPEED OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES

1. Social

The trend of Africans toward the city since the end of World War II has brought about profound social changes at a speed that is remarkable. This has severely taxed the Belgian administrator and legislator who has tried to keep ahead of the pressures. Housing, an urgent problem, lagged at first but is fast catching up with demand; the right of the African to private property--acknowledged in principle--is still not worked out institutionally; gradually more Africans are getting more than minimum wages in cash and less in kind; a commission is studying the matter of pensions for Africans in spite of opposition from employers; lay schools have been introduced, supported by public funds, despite stout resistance from the Roman Catholic Church; two universities have been opened in the Congo within the past 1-1/2 years; forced labor has been abolished in all but the most backward areas of the Colony; Congolese enjoy the same rights as others in accident compensation; the Government is studying ways and means of substituting private mutual health associations for government health service. As the Governor General said in his annual address in July 1955--it is intended to "inculcate a spirit of initiative and sense of responsibility which will detach the African progressively from the paternalism of our actual policy."

Another phenomena worth noting is that a census of Leopoldville in 1955 revealed 7,000 Africans among 300,000 who were working for their own account. Together they supported another 25,000 members of families. Thus 10% of the native population of Leopoldville lived free from the paternalism of the "patron".

Social recognition

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Social recognition of the African is slow. Bearers of civic merit cards may attend European spectacles (movies, concerts, lectures, etc.) and can frequent restaurants, bars, cafes. It is still rare to see Africans doing so for their own pleasure. They feel more comfortable in their own surroundings.

So while the scope and speed of social change is remarkable, it is manifest less outwardly than in the degree of security these changes afford the African. The trend to the cities has been slowed down considerably. It is doubtful that today more than a million of the 16 million Africans in the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi are what we would describe as city dwellers.* The other 15 million are in various stages of evolution. The great mass of them are still very backward. Resistance to change among them is strong. Most educated Africans in the Congo are regarded with scorn by the uneducated masses who regard them as Belgian stooges.

2. Economic

The major lines and trends of economic policy in the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi remain unchanged since IR-6390 was drafted 2-1/2 years ago. The threat of inflation in 1953 was successfully combatted in 1954. Exports and imports held up well in 1954 and 1955; world prices for raw materials remained at satisfactory levels; purchasing power of the salaried worker increased; Congo companies' dividends increased slightly, money was easy; there was no significant change in the gold cover or reserves and budget receipts exceeded expectations.

It is unlikely that for the foreseeable future and in spite of strenuous efforts to diversify the economy that the Congo's prosperity can be freed from the world market price for raw materials, principally minerals. Something can and will be done to cushion the effect of a drop in world prices: i.e. reduction in transport costs, mechanization of industrial processes, expansion of processing industry, a shift to electrical power in industry and transport, the possible establishment in the Lower Congo of a large industrial complex for mineral processing (Inga project). All of these are probable in the next several years.

A word should be said about Ruanda-Urundi. The Trust Territory is a financial liability--more than half of its annual cost is paid by the Belgian Treasury. It is over-populated--4-1/2 million souls in a territory scarcely larger than New Hampshire and Vermont combined. The soil is not good; cattle are overstocked. Considered as wealth, they are traditionally sacred. Feudalism still exists although the Belgians have tempered former excesses of the kings. Progress toward Westernization is proceeding at moderate pace. The utter poverty of the area, however, calls for drastic remedies (wholesale removal of populations to parts of the Belgian Congo; slaughter of 60-80% of cattle herds; wiping out of feudal kings), and these will not be taken except as a last and inescapable resort. Thus Ruanda-Urundi is and will remain a weak spot and a place where anti-Western propaganda could make headway. There is a small but wealthy Indian population that maintains connections with Indians in East Africa.

Belgians have

*Correction should be made to statement found in first paragraph, p. 6, of IR-7103, January 3, 1956, that urban population of Belgian Congo is 25%.

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Belgians have been as careful about labor unions in the Congo as about political parties. Two major unions exist but they are impotent. Unions may be expected to increase in strength and influence. The present Liberal/Socialist coalition government in Belgium, if it survives national elections in 1959, may contend successfully with the Big Five that have run the Congo's economy since Leopold II—Societe Generale, Banque de Bruxelles (Brufina), Empain Group, HCB and Forminiere. It is recognized that these interests have too much power and too little tendency to share it. However, to bring the Congo forward into the industrial phase of its development requires capital resources far beyond the means of even the Big Five. Resort will be had to foreign capital which, while it will come in on terms that give no preferences over those accorded Belgian capital, will in the process of putting this new capital to work force a number of fundamental social and economic changes that will have profound effects upon this part of Central Africa.

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Cld. No. 3Desp. No. 331From LeopoldvilleFRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICAA. GROWTH AND CONSEQUENCES OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

French Equatorial Africa is a Federation within the French Union of four Overseas Territories, covering 969,113 square miles of desert land in the north and equatorial forests in the south. Of its population of 4-1/2 million, 15,000 are European. The urban-rural ratio is 94:6. Registered voters in the National Assembly elections of January 2, 1956 were 1,177,716, of which number 58.8% voted. In the north (above parallel 9°) there are about one million Moslems. The population of the south is Bantu, and divided between Roman Catholics and pagans.

Although under the French Constitution of 1946 the African was granted the franchise (with reduced proportional representation and special rights to Europeans), political maturity is far from achieved. Politics center about personalities whose whose electoral appeal is local and tribal in the strictest sense. Fortunes of political parties vary with the popularity of the candidates. The French are guarding very closely against the emergence of any possible nationalist leaders. As followed in recent years, the French policy has been to introduce the young, intelligent F.E.A. politician to the pleasures and material benefits of Parisian life and the heady wine of French culture. In the case of M. BOGANDA in Oubangui and M. TCHICAYA in the Moyen Congo this policy has (from the French point of view) been eminently successful. A new candidate for political leadership in the Moyen Congo is the Abbe FULBERT YULU. It is expected that the course of FULBERT's career in the next year will follow the now classic pattern.

The Africans do have the vote, however, and this started the political evolution of the Federation. Elected African leaders mostly seek to enlarge the area of local autonomy rather than to agitate for nationalism or independence. During the elections of 1956 not one candidate espoused the cause of independence.

There are 1,000,000 Moslems in F.E.A.; 300,000 are Arab or part-Arab. The balance are divided into six ethnic groups which include Nilotic, Hamitic, Senegalese and Bantu strains. The largest single non-Moslem ethnic group of the northern area, the Sara Lakka, number 700,000. They are pagan and fiercely anti-Islam. Such ethnic diversity in the Tchad would create problems for Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islamism in the northern area of F.E.A.

The Moslems in F.E.A. are cut off from the south by more than mere geography or culture. There is a bitter memory in the Bantu mind of the Arab slave-trading days. In general, the Bantu in the south may be expected to strongly resist the encroachment of Islam. However, the Moslem bermousse robe is looked upon as a sign of social advancement by the less evolved African in F.E.A. cities such as Brazzaville, Bangui and Ft. Lamy.

Developments in the Sudan will have a good deal of effect in F.E.A. and are being closely watched by French authorities. Any African orientation in Egypt's policies will affect at least the Moslems in F.E.A. These two factors, when added

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to the deterioration of the French position in North Africa, render the political future of F.E.A. very uncertain. African students and political leaders in Paris must be influenced by the evident lack of decisiveness in French politics, particularly regarding colonial policy. For the present, F.E.A. must follow the fortunes of French politics. This is not an enviable situation for a Territory so backward and so full of growing pains, the least of which is nationalism.

B. OUTLOOK FOR INCREASED RACIAL TENSION

The French have made significant advances in removing the color bar which blocks Africans from achieving higher posts in government. Everywhere in government offices one notes a close working relationship between European and African and, in comparison with the Belgian Administration, the important positions occupied by Africans. In social relations, segregation is still a practical fact, though more Africans are to be found at official receptions and cocktail parties than is the case in the Belgian Congo. In his personal relations with the African, the Frenchman in F.E.A. appears to demonstrate a great deal more forbearance and respect for the individual than does the Belgian. Conversely, the African on the French side of the Congo appears to be more Europeanized (at least he speaks better French) than his Congolese brethren.

However, the implementation of the municipal reform system in F.E.A. will probably reveal white-black tension. However fatalistic he may be, the white man in Brazzaville, for example, is illy-prepared to accept a black mayor. The first test will come following the municipal elections set for June 1956. Tension between tribes was markedly evident in the elections in Brazzaville in January 1956. This may be expected to increase unless there is a marked upturn (unexpected) in the economic fortunes of the Territory.

The push of Moslems for political power will also increase tensions. The Catholic and Protestant Churches may be expected to react militantly to a Moslem crusading spirit. Since in F.E.A. the Moslem North and the Bantu South are separated by a sparsely populated region of questionable potential, physical contact between these religious and ethnic groupings will, for the time being, prevent any large-scale disorders such as threaten the Azandis in the Sudan. Should Arab nationalism of the Nasser variety gain headway in northern F.E.A., it could result in a separatist movement away from France and toward an Arab grouping. Northern F.E.A. is bound to feel the effect of the French struggle in North Africa.

C. LOCAL COMMUNIST STRENGTH, INFLUENCE, PROSPECTS, AND SOVIET INTENTIONS

Officially there is admitted to be no Communist Party in F.E.A. However, since January 1956 there has been a small hard core of about a dozen Communist activists organized at Fort Lamy. The elections last January disclosed a small following of the Communist Jacques N'GOT in the Gabon. His campaign was known to have been financed by the CPF. In nearly all the larger population centers, especially at Brazzaville and in the seaports, there are groups of pro-Communist radicals which constitute virtual Communist cells. The CGT, with its WFTU affiliations, is the strongest labor union in F.E.A. The masses have not at present evolved politically

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to the point where they are likely to follow a Communist leader as such, but some of the most popular African political and labor leaders of F.E.A. have already been exposed to Communist influences during attendance at international congresses behind the Iron Curtain. There are indications that certain leaders have been able to travel to these congresses due to the financial backing of the French Communist Party.

About 250 young Africans from F.E.A. are at present studying in France. The French Communist Party makes a serious effort to cultivate these students, and many of them have in the past attended Communist youth congresses, Communist cadre training courses, and have been targets for Communist indoctrination. This cultivation of African students from F.E.A. can logically be expected to continue with gradual increase in the number of indoctrinated and trained leaders returning to F.E.A. At the present time there are about 60 pro-Communist African labor union activists and leaders from F.E.A. who are in possession of valid passports. With these passports they are able to travel abroad without obtaining prior clearance from the F.E.A. authorities for each specific trip. Certain of the more radical elected representatives from F.E.A. also make trips behind the Iron Curtain to attend Communist congresses and festivals.

Importation of a variety of newspapers and other printed matter into F.E.A. is on a fairly liberal scale, but the Surete develops lists of regular subscribers to radical or suspect publications or magazines, as well as persons in correspondence with suspect addresses in Europe or elsewhere.

As is the case in other African colonies, there are active secret sects of a subversive nature. Leaders and activists are not usually prosecuted except on specific civil charges, but a close watch is kept on their activities and contacts. Although these sects are at the moment only potential fronts for Communist activities, the nature of such organizations makes them vulnerable to Communist exploitation.

Controls on movement of Africans between the Cameroons and F.E.A. are lax. Any pro-Communist movement in the Cameroons can be expected to have links with similar groups in F.E.A.

The traditional motto of France — liberte, egalite, fraternite — which has been more heavily emphasized in education than in practice in F.E.A., leaves the local government vulnerable to pressures by Africans of all political shades. These principles, not yet fully realized, offer the ideal Communist platform to unify these pressures for Communist ends. Vestiges of racial discrimination leave openings to the advantage of Communist trouble-makers. The greatest concentrations of malcontents as well as of Communist-indoctrinated Africans are to be found in the major population centers. Current reports of liberal financial backing of the CGT with funds from the CPF or the WFTU may well herald accelerated Communist-inspired activity, utilizing trained Communist cadres of evolues. It is almost certainly the intention of the CPF to make concerted efforts to spread Communist influence into F.E.A.

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It should not be forgotten that the strength of two Metropolitan organizations of the CPF and CGT constantly inhibits the activity of the local Surete in its attempt to control the spread of Communist influence in F.E.A.

Communism in F.E.A. is not now nor is it likely to become in the immediate future strong enough to constitute a threat to French authority. Communist intentions, therefore, most likely aim at quietly building up basic strength and potential leaders and acquiring influence in groups potentially exploitable as front organizations. Such a plan would have the additional advantage of producing activists susceptible of work in the Belgian Congo.

D. NATURE AND SPEED OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

The dominant factor of the economy of F.E.A. is the sharp dichotomy between the European and the African sectors. The European sphere is marked by the importance of foreign trade (32 billion C.F.A. francs, (\$183,000,000) or roughly 60% of F.E.A.'s national product in 1955). African income from foreign trade represents about 25% of the total. A large proportion of imports are consumers goods for Europeans. Private enterprise is marked by a closed, archaic corporation system, with very little entrepreneurship. Private investment is limited and is increasing but slowly. Profits are not reinvested to any great extent, but sent to France.

The African sector is largely a subsistence economy based on the production of crops (manioc, 600,000 tons per year; millet, 700,000 tons per year), or the raising of livestock, which scarcely enter into the money economy. In 1953, the total salaried income for Africans was 11,150 million francs C.F.A. (\$64,000,000) or \$14.25 per capita. The number of wage earners is about 175,000. It is estimated that 90% of the Africans live completely outside the money economy. Low African income is paralleled by an extremely low level of savings (less than 5%). Due to backward agricultural methods, underemployment is high in the rural areas. Eight percent of the Brazzaville labor force is unemployed.

The economy of F.E.A. may also be characterized as artificial. With the exception of wood, which gains badly needed hard currency, all of the major exports are dependent on the French market and are heavily subsidized by the Metropole. Rigid exchange controls result in 70% of F.E.A.'s imports coming from high-cost French producers.

F.E.A. production suffers from a paradox of high labor costs, yet low wages. Due to the lack of capital investment in agriculture and industry there is a high ratio of variable to fixed costs. Labor costs have risen due largely to politically promised social benefits and the important role of labor unions in F.E.A. Productivity has not kept pace with this rise in costs.

One of the major hindrances to the future of economic development in F.E.A. is the extremely low population density. Due to endemic diseases and poor soil, large areas of the Moyen Congo and the Gabon are almost totally uninhabited. Any future large-scale economic development will have to face the problem of a labor shortage.

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The total budget expenditures in 1955 amounted to 5,580 million francs C.F.A. (\$34,100,000), or \$7.50 per capita, as against \$4.06 per capita in the United States. Eighty-five percent of receipts come from indirect taxes. The finances of the F.E.A. Government are thus seen to be as much a consequence as a prime mover of the economic situation of the Federation.

The French authorities have tackled vigorously in recent years the public health problems presented by the large incidence of such endemic diseases as malaria, leprosy, sleeping sickness and yaws. In education, 21.3% of school age children are now in schools. Between 1952 and 1955 the number of girls in primary schools increased by 75%, but the problem of educating the African woman is still acute.

In the last three years a long-term campaign for the build-up of agricultural and village life has been stepped up with the paysannat (peasant village community). If it succeeds, the paysannat program will do much for the economy of F.E.A. However, it faces a long, uphill fight against the strong pull of urbanization. Another agricultural development is the Tchad livestock program, which is being implemented with the aid of the United States I.C.A. personnel and funds.

The emphasis on the development of communications has been and will continue to be rather slow. Considering the immense distances between economic regions of the Federation and the seacoast, capital investment in communications has been rather small (4 billion francs, \$22,800,000) from 1953 to 1955 under the Metropolitan Four Year Plan. There have also been conflicting policies over the important railroad outlet for the Tchad.

One of the major factors in the extremely backward state of F.E.A.'s economy has been the lack of valuable mineral exports. The policy of the Government toward the development of proven mineral reserves has been cautious. This, however, is being stepped up. The Mekambo (Gabon) iron reserves, in which the Bethlehem Steel Company has a 55% controlling interest in the exploration concession, are large. Comilog, a French firm with 50% United States Steel Company interests, has recently finished a lengthy study of an evacuation route for the important manganese deposits of Franceville (Gabon). When satisfactory arrangements are concluded in Paris, this enterprise will move into the exploitation stage. Tentative gestures are now being made toward the further prospecting of the recently discovered oil reserves near Port Gentil, the potential of which is presently unknown. From parallel strikes in Angola and the Cameroons, it is possible that a coastal oil bed may be found to exist in the Gabon.

The development of industries in F.E.A. has been very slow. At the present time there are only a few, scattered light consumers goods plants. An almost self-evident industry in F.E.A. would be cotton textiles, but it appears that the interests of the French textile industry will dictate a continuation of the economically wasteful cotton export subsidies. The Kouilou hydroelectric project is a bright spot in the industrial future of F.E.A. A group of firms with large French and Canadian participating interests has been formed to exploit the hydroelectric potential of the Kouilou river near Pointe-Noire for the processing of French and Ivory Coast bauxite.

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However, with the exception of the Crystal Mountain area of southwestern F.E.A., where the population is relatively sparse, the vast majority of the Federation suffers from a dearth of hydroelectric power potential. This lack of power, coupled with a lack of capital, low income, a deficient and unskilled labor supply, a poorly developed transportation system and a rudimentary interior market structure, indicate that for the foreseeable future F.E.A. will remain one of the most backward of France's overseas territories. Should events in North Africa follow their present course, it is possible that France's economic interest in F.E.A. may increase. The pattern of French investment following the loss of Indo-China would seem to indicate, however, that the basic obstacles indicated above will mitigate against any significant French private investment in F.E.A.

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Desp. No. 331From LeopoldvilleFRENCH CAMEROONSA. GROWTH AND CONSEQUENCES OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

It is apparent that the Communists selected the French Cameroons as an area to experiment with the manipulation of Black Africans. Anyone who studies the rise and fall of the UPC (Union des Populations du Cameroun) cannot fail to be impressed by the skill with which a handful of trained African Communists built up a political following, defied constituted authority and finally, in May 1955, went down in a blood bath (see UN Trusteeship Council Document T/1231, February 17, 1956). Essentially UPC leaders used nationalism as a rallying slogan. They espoused the cause of unification of the French and British Cameroons. They had a strong and active following in the South but relatively little success in the Moslem North. Following the riots the UPC was outlawed and most of its leaders fled or were jailed. They are, however, working underground and remain a menace today.

The UPC type of nationalism should be studied as an example of a "Moscow type" of a political grab for power in Africa. The effort, although abortive, was instructive.

A Communist Cameroons would be an arrow of subversion stuck deep into the belly of Central Africa at a highly strategic location. The UPC is still licking its wounds and still legally banned. But amnesty is being sought for its exiled and jailed leaders by concerted effort on the part of the four Cameroons deputies to the French Assembly. They will probably have another try.

Nationalism in any case is bound to find an expression in the Cameroons. Of all the French West African areas it is the most politically active. Being a Trust Territory, its eventual political fate will probably be decided by plebiscite. It may or may not decide to remain a part of the French Union. It cannot fail to be influenced by events in the Gold Coast and in neighboring Nigeria. There is today a strong and growing pride in merely being a "Camerounaise". The UPC's methods are fairly generally deplored, but its program receives wide support even outside UPC following. Political leaders know this and will capitalize on it. This leads to the conclusion that African nationalism in the Cameroons is not only on the increase but is there to stay.

If the Territory emerges as an African state with Western orientation, it will exercise small influence elsewhere in Central Africa. It will speed demands for political progress in F.E.A. But if the Cameroons, on finding its own feet, should have an anti-Western bearing and be pro-Soviet, then it would cause serious repercussions. A pro-Soviet state situated at the waist of Africa would constitute a grave strategic threat if combined with an anti-Western Sudan.

There are internal difficulties in the way of a united and free Cameroons. Just above the 4th parallel north the traditional and feudal power of the Sultans is encountered. They will not yield easily or willingly to upstart nationalist

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politicians from the South. The younger Moslem element is becoming increasingly independent in their political opinions and more likely to vote according to their conviction rather than to follow blindly their traditional feudal overlord.

The Sultans may be relied upon to support efforts to delay the advent of independence. On the other hand, the Moslems may seek support from a revived Arab League outside the Cameroons and thus emerge as the stronger of the two contending forces in the Territory.

Whatever happens, the area will bear watching and need to be made aware of the United States. It is hoped nothing interferes with the establishment of an American consular office in the Territory in 1956

B. OUTLOOK FOR INCREASED RACIAL TENSION

Racial tension, as such, is only a minor problem in the French Cameroons. The existence of white settlers is not a major issue. Since the violence of May 1955, the French Administration has taken positive measures toward the "Africanization" of government personnel at all levels. The Catholic Church has likewise taken concrete action in the same direction by the naming of two Cameroonese Bishops.

Racial discrimination, however, is still a sore point. The two college electoral system is an outstanding issue with both Europeans and Africans. Because of the importance of European investments in the Territory, French residents take the stand that they have a right to direct representation in the National Assembly and other representative bodies. The Cameroonese look upon the dual college system as exemplifying racial discrimination.

Discrimination is felt especially in the economic field, and to a lesser degree socially. The Cameroonese merchant does not enjoy the same advantages of credit as Europeans. Moreover, Cameroonese, financially unable to buy from wholesalers, are forced to deal with jobbers. In many cases the jobber competes with his Cameroonese client in the retail trade. Not infrequently, the Cameroonese small merchant finds himself undercut in price by the jobber--the jobber's retail price being advertised below the price paid by the Cameroonese merchant.

Racial tension has always existed between the Moslem North and the Bantu South. These racial differences are presently held in check by the French tutorship but may be expected to loom menacingly over the prospect of a free and independent Cameroons state of the future.

C. LOCAL COMMUNIST STRENGTH, INFLUENCE, PROSPECTS, AND SOVIET INTENTIONS

There is no recognized Communist Party in the French Cameroons. Present day as well as potential pro-Communist influence in the French Cameroons springs largely from widespread frustrated political ambitions among the Cameroons people. This potential source of Communist support is far stronger in the Bantu South (centered in Douala and Yaounde) than in the Moslem North.

The CGT

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The CGT (in 1945) was the first Communist-controlled organization to take root in the Cameroons. It has come to be the largest and most influential labor union in the Cameroons. The Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) developed first as a political party outgrowth of the CGT, and several of the principal leaders of Cameroons CGT were among the most militant leaders of UPC. Especially from late 1954 until its outlawing by the French Government in July 1955, the UPC grew progressively and rapidly more violently anti-Administration. From early 1955 it acquired increasingly popular support from the most volubly discontented element of the population in the Douala and Yaounde areas. During the months immediately preceding the violent disorders of May 1955 the UPC's party structure, its avowed policy in favor of immediate unification and independence for the Cameroons, the pattern of "rolling strikes" set off by the cooperating CGT, the propaganda themes and catch phrases of both the UPC and the CGT, all acquired the earmarks now grown familiar from Communist-inspired political action movements in other parts of the world.

At the time of the May 1955 outbreaks, the UPC was by far the best organized Cameroons political party and had the greatest number of active supporters. But it was not a mass movement. It was not openly opposed by Cameroonesse public opinion, but neither were its principles then actively supported by widespread public opinion. The French Government and the Cameroons Administration hoped and believed that by outlawing the UPC and making a major drive to suppress the underground remnants of the Party organization and activists the relatively unorganized and inactive popular support for immediate Cameroons independence could be brought under control.

But contrary to the expectations of the Administration, Cameroons public opinion in favor of the basic principles first espoused by the UPC has become even more widespread in recent months. The violent methods advocated and resorted to by the UPC leaders and activists are stigmatized by responsible Cameroonesse political and labor leaders, but popular opinion is strongly sympathetic with the principles behind the UPC demands. Communist influence behind and manipulation of this popular opinion in favor of independence is a far less important element than was the case with UPC. However, the responsible Cameroonesse leaders of today fear that, if the masses are not in the near future appeased by the assurance of specific progressive steps leading to eventual political self-determination for the Cameroons, the Territory will once again become the arena of further Communist-inspired political action. These elected Cameroonesse leaders fear that if they are not enabled to channel these popular ambitions through logically established steps which clearly lead to eventual political self-determination, resistance to continued French Administration may become the tool of other personally interested Cameroonesse leaders not above accepting Communist support and following Communist directives for reasons of personal advantage. The masses, especially in the south, are fast reaching a state of such frustration that they would follow any Cameroonesse leader who promises action and results within the foreseeable future.

The Cameroons Administration, the elected representatives to the French National Assembly and other French legislative bodies are all considering the advisability of extending amnesty to UPC leaders and activists. A split in UPC appears to be developing. A small fraction of adamant resistance to continued French

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Administration and in favor of the original demands of UPC is headed by Felix MOUNIE. The more moderate fraction, led by Ruben UM NYOBE, may be willing (at least outwardly) to reduce the immediacy of its demands for Cameroons independence and to cooperate with the Administration in a more gradual but nonetheless definite plan of evolution toward Cameroons political self-determination. An amnesty to UPC leaders and activists would do much to prove to the Cameroonee masses the good faith of the French tutorship of the Territory. But UM NYOBE's known record of strong past Communist affiliation and indoctrination constitutes an element of real risk. If, as seems to be very possible, he and his faction of UPCists should once again legally enter the Cameroons political scene, there is a chance that he will head up a pro-Communist underground network while appearing to cooperate with the Administrative Authority. On the other hand, his faction of UPC may prove to be as viable and tractable as has been the case with the HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY wing of the RDA.

From May 1955, when Jacques N'GOM, Secretary General of the CGT, was imprisoned, until January 1956, the CGT was relatively inactive. In February 1956, two French organizers arrived in Douala. At about the same time, N'GOM was released from prison. Besides his CGT office, he was one of the principal members of the Directing Committee of the UPC. N'GOM and the organizers from France appear to be cooperating in the reorganization and reactivation of CGT in the Cameroons. Since early February 1956 there have been reports of the granting of a substantial annual subsidy by WFTU to the Cameroons CGT. If these reports have a basis in fact (which seems probable), this indicates that Soviet interest in the Cameroons remains strong.

In addition to Communist cultivation of political and labor groups in the Cameroons, Cameroonee students in the Metropole are not overlooked. At the present time there are about 725 of these Cameroonee students in Europe. Most of them are in France. Many of them are known to be the targets of concentrated Communist cultivation. They are given paid vacations in Iron Curtain countries. They are given expense-paid trips to Communist youth congresses. After a very liberal exposure to Communist hospitality and indoctrination, many of them can be expected to return to the Cameroons to take up their professions or trades. Certainly international Communist cultivation of these students has a very definite end in view. Any Cameroonee who has travelled or studied abroad enjoys prestige far above that of the majority of even his most evolved fellow countrymen. His advice, council and leadership would receive most respectful consideration from a vast majority of the less fortunate Cameroonee.

If the Administration, with the cooperation of elected Cameroonee leaders, demonstrates to the Cameroonee masses that France is leading the Territory toward political self-determination through specific steps mutually agreed upon, then Soviet influence will find increasingly less fertile ground for the growth of subversive ideas. However, it appears to be in the best interests of international Communism to continue to cultivate the more radical and discontented elements in labor and politics for use in future political action in the Cameroons.

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D. NATURE AND SPEED OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES

The French administering authority has proceeded with commendable haste in endowing the area with modern amenities bearing in mind the poverty of the Territory and the preoccupations of the French Union elsewhere. The pace has been even faster since the riots of May 1955. There are many reasons why the Cameroons should progress at faster pace than French Equatorial Africa. Prior to World War I it was a German colony and there are many surviving evidences of the vigor of those days; the area has long been exposed to Western influences through trading; the watchdogging of the League of Nations and the United Nations has also forced the pace of social and economic change.

Labor syndicates patterned after parent organizations in Metropolitan France are developing along conventional lines. Primary education is general and facilities have improved greatly since 1946; 55% of children of school age are in school as against 21.3% for F.E.A. Secondary education lags but numbers of young students go on to French universities for higher education.

The country is poor, however. There are few exploitable minerals. Cocoa, coffee, cotton, bananas and lumber are the principal sources of wealth. Industry is small. A processing plant for bauxite is under construction at Edea where a sizeable hydroelectric plant has been erected. German-built railroad lines exist to Yaounde and N'Kongsamba, both out from Douala. A road, mostly dirt track, exists north to Ft. Lamy in F.E.A. Other main roads remain in large part to be improved for all-season use.

It is believed that the pace of social change will slow down somewhat for Western impact has caused great dislocation and a period of adjustment is in order. Economically the country having profited temporarily from the high price of cocoa must await capital investment for further development. Improvements will continue to be made in bolstering subsistence products with some slight amelioration in staple diet in prospect.

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